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Abstract 1 
The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the human 2 
evolutionary literature. Among several contributing mechanisms, one hypothesis points to culturally 3 
evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behavior 4 
toward geographically distant co-religionists who are unlikely to reciprocate. Furthermore, another 5 
hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the 6 
expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioral experiments 7 
and an extensive set of interviews to a sample of 2,228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These 8 
populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, subsistence farmers and wage laborers, 9 
practicing world religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also different forms of 10 
animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in 11 
which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, 12 
and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing reliably 13 
predicted decreased local favoritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists 14 
(DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on outgroup allocations revealed considerable 15 
between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, some religious elements 16 
may be implicated in cooperative behavior toward outgroup members as well. These results provide 17 
support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods who care about human 18 
normative conduct help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open new questions 19 
about how different traditions respond to religious outgroups. 20 
Key words: Cultural Evolution; Impartiality; Punishing Gods; Parochialism; Religion; Supernatural 21 
Punishment 22 
 23 
Introduction 24 
Over the last 12 millennia, the scale of human societies has dramatically expanded from hunter-gatherer 25 
networks involving a few hundred individuals to vast nation-states involving millions. Theories explaining 26 
the scaling-up of societies have combined insights about evolved cognition with cultural evolutionary 27 
models of social norms [1–3], delineating important roles for markets, kinship systems, marriage 28 
institutions, and religions [4–7]. Focusing on the role of supernatural beliefs, cultural evolution may have 29 
favored the extension of intuitions about social punishment to beliefs in increasingly interventionist 30 
gods who, because of their capacity to monitor and punish people for violating norms related to 31 
interpersonal conduct, fostered less favoritism toward individuals themselves, their families, and their 32 
communities vis-à-vis strangers sharing religious identities, effectively expanding the cooperative circle 33 
[8]. 34 
Historically, competition among communities to control fertile lands dramatically intensified at 35 
the onset of the Holocene, favoring larger, sedentary populations capable of communal defense and 36 
various forms of collective action [9,10]. Although there are ongoing debates about the precise timing of 37 
these historical changes and the nature of the causal relationships, a combination of archaeological and 38 
ethnographic data [11,12] suggests that the scaling-up of societies was associated with the gradual 39 
 3 
 
evolution of religious beliefs and practices into cultural packages that included more powerful gods who 1 
were increasingly motivated and capable of monitoring norms favorable to the emergence  of large 2 
scale societies. In particular, analyses of ethnographic data revealed the centrality of divine punishment 3 
in the evolution of political complexity in the Pacific [13] and robust global relationships between beliefs 4 
in punishing gods and various indicators of societal scale and complexity [14–16]. 5 
Consistent with these observations, global surveys have linked a stronger belief in heaven, hell, 6 
and punishing gods with stronger moral disapproval for cheating on taxes, buying stolen goods, and 7 
other such public goods [17], and a cross-cultural study of market integration revealed robust 8 
correlations between adherence to world religions involving moralizing deities and prosociality in 9 
economic games [6]. Complementing these macro-level patterns, a substantial body of literature using 10 
priming techniques has shown that among believers, religious reminders can effectively reduce self-11 
favoritism and increase resource-sharing in economic games involving strangers [18–21]. Importantly, to 12 
experimentally test the role of belief in punishing and monitoring gods in the expansion of cooperative 13 
circle, we previously employed the Random Allocation Game (RAG) among participants from eight 14 
diverse field sites, and found that beliefs in monitoring and punishing gods were associated with less 15 
favoritism toward the self and local communities when playing with geographically distant co-16 
religionists [8,22]. 17 
However, while these initial findings support the hypothesis of intra-religious impartiality (i.e., 18 
extending impartiality to geographically distant co-religionists), the question as to whether these beliefs 19 
may also favor more equitable treatment of religious outgroups remains open to study. One cultural 20 
group selection account [23] suggested that parochial cooperation should be generally favored 21 
(compared to indiscriminate prosociality and uncooperative selfishness), especially during fierce conflict 22 
over resources/values [24,25] because it gives a competitive edge to groups with tight cooperative 23 
norms [26]. While supernaturally sanctioned norms may stabilize cooperation within a particular 24 
religious group (intra-religious impartiality), other groups may have different normative regulations 25 
and/or not extend their norms to outsiders [27]. Hence, cooperation between groups with different 26 
supernatural commitments is risky and prone to free-riding, predicting parochialism as a baseline 27 
relationship between religious groups. However, the cultural evolutionary account put forth by 28 
Norenzayan et al. [23] also predicts that in situations where a more inclusive strategy attracts new 29 
recruits and enhances cooperative networks, group norms may shift toward more universal application 30 
and indiscriminate prosociality to incorporate the members of religious outgroups if they are not in a 31 
direct conflict over resources/values [28,29]. To date, evidence appears to be mixed: some studies 32 
showed that participants affiliated with religions emphasizing universal morality embrace the extension 33 
of cooperation behavior to outgroup members [20,30–32] while other studies indicated that religious 34 
participants reveal hostility toward religious outgroups [33,34]. 35 
In this paper, we present data from 2,228 participants sampled in 15 socio-ecologically and 36 
religiously diverse societies (see Tab. 1). We aimed to replicate our previous findings that belief in 37 
punishing and monitoring gods helps curbing local favoritism [8,22] by deploying the same protocol in 38 
additional societies and, moreover, by deploying a different economic game, namely the Dictator Game 39 
(DG). Furthermore, we aimed to extend the previous research by examining the outstanding questions 40 
about the role of beliefs in punishing gods in the treatment of religious outgroups. At each site, we used 41 
preliminary ethnographic interviews to select one god interested in norms of interpersonal conduct, and 42 
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assessed those gods’ abilities to monitor norm following and punish transgressions. In line with previous 1 
research, we labeled such gods as “moralizing” [22]; however, note that these gods need not be creator 2 
or supreme gods and do not need to care about “morality” as understood in Western philosophy. 3 
Rather, they care about group-specific norms regulating interpersonal conduct [35,36]. As a comparison, 4 
we also selected locally salient gods on the basis of their being relatively less concerned with 5 
interpersonal conduct, less punitive, and less knowledgeable than their “moralizing” counterparts 6 
(except for Hadza, Lovu, and Samburu sites where such gods could not be identified; see SM, section 7 
S2.2 for details). 8 
We adapted two experimental games, the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator 9 
Game (DG), to measure two distinct facets of cooperative behavior: curbed favoritism and impartial 10 
resource sharing. In the RAG, participants anonymously selected one of two cups designated for 11 
different recipients. They rolled a fair, two-colored die. If it came up one color, participants were 12 
supposed to put the coin into the cup they selected. If the die came up the other color, participants 13 
were supposed to put the coin into the opposite cup. Participants repeated this procedure for 30 coin 14 
allocations and understood that all money will be distributed accordingly [37]. Since the allocations 15 
were made in private, only the participants knew their decisions and they could distribute the 16 
endowment according to their preferences (rather than die rolls), reflecting in- and/or out-group biases. 17 
In the DG, participants anonymously allocated 10 coins between two recipients (also designated by 18 
cups) based purely on their preferences [38]. These games have been widely used in cross-cultural 19 
research and benchmarked against relevant real world behaviors [6,37,39–42]. In different ways, these 20 
experiments permit us to assess the relationship between people’s religious beliefs and their biases in 21 
favor of themselves, their families, and their communities. 22 
Participants played four rounds of either the RAG or the DG, distributing endowed money 23 
between two cups in each round. To investigate the intra-religious impartiality, two rounds consisted of 24 
contributions to distant co-religionists versus the self (SELF vs. DISTANT) or local co-religionists (LOCAL vs. 25 
DISTANT). These two rounds aimed to replicate prior findings that belief in punishing and monitoring gods 26 
Tab. 1. Site Descriptive Statistics 
Group Country N DISTANT OUTGROUP  Prime Moralizing God Local God 
Cachoeira Brazil 274 Candomble Evangelical MLSC Christian God Candomblé God (Ogum) 
Coastal Tanna Vanuatu 178 Christian Kastom MLC Christian God Garden spirit (Tupunus) 
Hadza Tanzania 201 Hadza Datoga - Haine (Traditional) Ishoko* 
Huatasani Peru 94 Catholic Evangelical MC Christian God Mountain Spirits/Christ. Saints 
Inland Tanna Vanuatu 112 Kastom Christian MC Kalpapan (Traditional) Garden spirit (Tupunus) 
Kananga DRC 200 Non-Luluwa Christ. Non-Luluwa MLSC Christian God Kadim/Ancestor spirits 
Lovu Fiji 76 Hindu --- MC Hindu Bhagwan None available 
Marajó Brazil 77 Christian --- MC Christian God Virgin Mary 
Indo-Mauritians Mauritius 245 Hindu Muslim MSC Hindu Shiva Ghost (Nam) 
Mysore India 165 Hindu Christian MC Hindu Shiva Chamundeshwari 
Samburu Kenya 40 Christ. Samburu Samburu - Christian/Traditional (Nkai) None available 
Sursurunga Papua New Guinea 163 Christ. Sursurunga Foreigner MLC Christ. God (Káláu) Spirit (Sírmát) 
Turkana Kenya 247 Christ. Turkana Turkana MLSC Christ. God (Akuj) Ancestor spirits 
Tyvans Tyva Republic 81 Buddhist --- MC Buddha Burgan Spirit-masters (Cher eezi) 
Yasawa Fiji 75 Hindu --- MC Christian God Ancestor spirits (Kalou-vu) 
Notes: *There are no Ishoko data in Wave II (see SM, S2.2.3). DRC = Democratic Republic Congo. Primes: M = Moralizing gods prime; L = Local gods prime; S = 
Secular authority prime; C = Control condition. No Outgroups were selected for sites taking part only in Wave I (see Methods). 
 5 
 
promotes expansion of rule following toward DISTANT co-religionists (RAG); and to assess whether 1 
these beliefs are also associated with increased resource-sharing (DG). The other two experimental 2 
rounds collected data on allocations to religious outgroups compared to allocations to the self (SELF vs. 3 
OUTGROUP) or to distant co-religionists (DISTANT vs. OUTGROUP), aiming to assess whether belief in 4 
punishing and monitoring gods promotes indiscriminate prosociality or whether the cooperative circle is 5 
limited only to religious ingroups (religious parochialism). SELF represented allocations that participants 6 
made to themselves. LOCAL co-religionist allocations were distributed to randomly selected, anonymous 7 
members of the same religion (associated with the selected moralizing gods) in the camp/village/town 8 
where we conducted experiments. DISTANT co-religionist allocations were distributed to randomly 9 
selected, anonymous individuals in a geographically distant village who practice the same religion as 10 
LOCALs. OUTGROUP allocations were distributed to anonymous members of a different religion in a 11 
geographically remote village (OUTGROUPs were selected such that they were not in a direct conflict 12 
with LOCALs). 13 
Finally, to investigate the causal relationship between beliefs in moralizing gods and treatment 14 
of other groups, we utilized priming techniques by using locally salient reminders of a) punishing and 15 
monitoring moralizing gods; b) relatively less moralistically punitive and knowledgeable local gods; c) 16 
secular authorities (e.g., police); and d) a control condition. Although previous research has suggested 17 
causal influence of punishing gods on rule-following and resource sharing [21], the use of priming 18 
methods has been almost exclusively limited to Western populations and it is not clear whether the 19 
reported effects extend also to small-scale, non-industrial societies. By selecting our sites, we aimed to 20 
capture a significant portion of the world’s human diversity while investigating the individual-level 21 
effects of belief in and priming with moralizing gods. We pre-registered two sets of predictions in the 22 
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/epkbw/) before data analysis:   23 
1. Expanding the Cooperative Circle to Distant Co-Religionists (DISTANT Games) 24 
Corresponding to the intra-religious impartiality hypothesis, we predicted that participants who 25 
(A) reported higher ratings of moralizing gods as punitive and monitoring will show less 26 
favoritism toward the SELF and LOCAL co-religionists when playing with DISTANT co-religionists 27 
in the RAG and DG, with cups labeled as SELF vs. DISTANT and LOCAL vs. DISTANT. Likewise, 28 
participants who (B) were primed with the concept of punitive and monitoring moralizing gods 29 
will show less SELF and LOCAL co-religionist favoritism compared to the other conditions. 30 
2. Parochial Religious Norm Adherence (OUTGROUP Games) 31 
According to the religious parochialism hypothesis, allocations in the SELF vs. OUTGROUP RAG and 32 
DG should not be influenced by (A) the ratings of, or (B) priming with, punitive and monitoring 33 
moralizing gods. That is, participants should bias allocations toward the SELF, irrespective of 34 
their religious belief or treatment conditions due to the limited scope of religious norms. 35 
Moreover, we predicted that when allocating between DISTANT co-religionists and 36 
OUTGROUPs, participants who (C) reported higher ratings of, or (D) were primed with, punitive 37 
and monitoring moralizing gods will bias their allocations away from OUTGROUP members and 38 
in favor of DISTANT co-religionists in both the RAG and DG (religious parochialism). However, we 39 
also explored whether participants at Christian sites (universalistic, proselytizing religion) will 40 
taper their bias against OUTGROUPs by virtue of the aforementioned propensity to attract new 41 
members (indiscriminate prosociality). 42 
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Methods 1 
Participants  2 
During two waves of data collection, we recruited a total of 2,228 participants from 15 societies (1,126 3 
females; M age = 37.0, SD = 14.8). Specifically, during Wave I, we recruited 591 participants who played 4 
the DISTANT RAGs and reported the results of this data collection in several publications [8,22]; 5 
however, 208 of those participants were contacted again during Wave II to collect the OUTGROUP RAGs. 6 
For Wave II, 1637 new participant were recruited, playing either the DISTANT and OUGROUP RAGs or 7 
the DISTANT and OUTGROUP DGs (153 participants played both RAGs and DGs). Here, we collapsed both 8 
Wave I and Wave II samples to provide robust tests of our hypotheses. 9 
We excluded all participants from our analyses whose allocations did not sum to 30 for a 10 
particular RAG or 10 for a particular DG. Specifically, we excluded 30 participants from at least one RAG 11 
and 33 from at least one DG. Furthermore, we excluded 22 participants who misunderstood the 12 
procedure or did not correctly follow procedural steps. At one site, two research assistants 13 
counterfeited data, thus all the RAG and DG data collected by these assistants were removed (72 14 
participants). The number of participants in each analysis is displayed under specific models. While 15 
tables in the main text report only full models (these are missing three sites due to missing some of the 16 
co-variates), reduced models including all sites can be found in the SM, section S3. Our protocols were 17 
approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board (BREB) and by the 18 
equivalent at each individual researcher’s home university. All subjects provided an informed verbal 19 
consent for participation before the experiment. 20 
Procedures 21 
Participants were recruited by random sampling from a street or chain sampling, while in smaller 22 
communities, researchers randomly sampled households. Upon arrival at a study location, participants 23 
were asked to wait before the experiment in a separate area to prevent collusion, and then entered 24 
individually into a room/tent/or a secluded area to play the RAGs and DGs. Before playing the games, 25 
each participant was given a show-up fee (approximating 1/4 of one day’s wage), learned about game-26 
specific rules, and had to demonstrate an understanding of those rules. Afterwards, the participant was 27 
left alone to play four rounds of either RAGs or DGs. Both DGs and RAGs were played in a random order. 28 
After the gameplay was finished, each participant received the amount contributed to the SELF cups and 29 
was escorted into a different area for demographic and religiosity interviews where we asked about 30 
moralizing and local gods (see SM, section S2 for more details on procedure). 31 
Materials 32 
We first conducted ethnographic surveys asking roughly 20 participants to list and rank up to five gods 33 
and spirits, from which each site selected one monitoring and punitive god/spirit (here labeled 34 
‘moralizing’) and one god/spirit less concerned with the interpersonal aspects of human normative 35 
behavior (here labeled ‘local’). Confirming our choices of moralizing vs. local gods, the survey showed 36 
that the selected moralizing gods were rated on average as more punitive and monitoring than local 37 
gods, more concerned with interpersonal norms, and more rewarding. The magnitude of these 38 
differences varied by site (SM, Tab. S3). To examine the relationship between belief in punitive and 39 
monitoring gods who care about norm transgressions (i.e., moralizing gods) and the RAG and DG 40 
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allocations, we created a punishment-monitoring score by averaging four binary questions pertaining to 1 
the gods’ ability and willingness to punish and monitor people. Note that apart from this composite 2 
measure, we also planned to examine the monitoring and punishing factors separately as in our 3 
previous study [22]; however, there was not enough variation in the monitoring factor to afford such 4 
analyses (for discussion see SM 2.1.2). All materials were translated from English into the local 5 
languages and back-translated to English to assure translation accuracy. 6 
 To examine the causal relationship between moralizing gods and impartiality, we adapted 7 
priming materials to the specificities of local contexts (see Tab. 1 for an overview of primed concepts). 8 
Four of our sites (Cachoeira, Mauritius, Sursurunga, Yasawa) used contextual priming in the RAGs 9 
(games were played inside a temple and a control location) while other sites used religious/secular 10 
imagery printed on a mat/table cloth (Coastal and Inland Tanna, Kananga, Huatasani, and Mauritius DG); 11 
religious/secular material objects (Cachoeira DG, Lovu, Marajó, Mysore, Turkana, Tyva); or verbal 12 
priming (Sursurunga DG).  See SM, sections S2 and S3 for details. Note that in our correlational analyses, 13 
we hold the priming effects constant to account for the fact that not all sites used priming. 14 
Analyses 15 
In our regression models, we used the punishment-monitoring score of moralizing gods as well as our 16 
treatment conditions as main predictors of the RAG and DG allocations, controlling for a host of 17 
potentially confounding variables. In five modeling steps, we hold site-membership constant as simple 18 
fixed effects (i.e., mean site allocations), allowing us to make inferences about the general effect present 19 
across our sites while accounting for unmeasured between-site variance. Furthermore, we control for 20 
potentially competing explanations by holding constant the ratings of moralizing gods’ rewarding 21 
abilities, local gods’ punishment-monitoring score, and relationship to local secular authorities (e.g. 22 
police). Apart from these controls, we also hold constant demographic variables, emotional closeness to 23 
LOCAL, DISTANT and OUTGROUPS and game-related variables such as game-order (see SM, section S3 24 
for details). 25 
Results 26 
We observed high between-site variability in mean allocations in the RAG and DG (see Fig. 1). On 27 
average, in both games, participants tended to allocate more coins to the SELF and to LOCAL co-28 
religionists compared to DISTANT co-religionists and OUTGROUPs. The allocations were generally more 29 
equitable in the RAG compared to the DG (despite the greater anonymity in the RAG), indicating that the 30 
rule-following aspect of the RAG played an important role in participants’ decision-making. 31 
Moralizing Gods Promote Allocations to Distant Co-Religionists 32 
To replicate our previous findings from Wave I [8,22], we first analyzed the DISTANT RAGs on the sample 33 
from both data collection waves. In the enlarged sample and in line with Wave I, we observed that 34 
participants who rated their moralizing god as more punitive and monitoring tended to allocate more 35 
money to DISTANT co-religionists. Figure 2 illustrates that going from zero to one in our punishment-36 
monitoring score was associated with an increase in the mean allocations to DISTANT co-religionists. To 37 
examine this effect more closely, we regressed RAG allocations on the punishment-monitoring scores 38 
using binomial regression models. In all specifications, the estimated punishment-monitoring 39 
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coefficients were positive, predicting larger DISTANT allocations: rating moralizing gods as punitive and 1 
monitoring increased the chances of allocating a coin to the DISTANT cup by 26% [95% CI = 6% – 49%] in 2 
the SELF vs. DISTANT RAG and by 22% [95% CI = 3% – 45%] in the LOCAL vs. DISTANT RAG. Crucially, none of 3 
the key control variables, including ratings of moralizing gods as rewarding, local gods’ punishment and 4 
monitoring abilities, or relationship to secular authority, showed stable effects on DISTANT allocations 5 
(see Tab. 2, Fig. 3, and SM, section S3.2 for specific modeling steps and Fig. S6 for comparison of Wave I 6 
and Wave II). 7 
To extend the RAG results to a different economic game measuring a distinct facet of intra-8 
religious impartiality, we included the DISTANT DGs during Wave II. We observed similar effects of 9 
moralizing gods on DISTANT allocations as in the RAGs (see Fig. 2). Regressing the DISTANT allocations 10 
on the punishment-monitoring measure in a series of five Tobit models revealed that the punishment-11 
monitoring score was associated with an increase in participants’ allocations to DISTANT co-religionists. 12 
The effects of moralizing gods’ ratings predicted up to a 1.25 coin increase [95% CI = 0.25 – 2.24] in 13 
allocations to DISTANT co-religionists when playing with the SELF, and up to a 0.89 coin increase [95% CI 14 
= 0.07 – 1.70] when playing with LOCAL (maximum allocation was 10 coins). These results held for 15 
various model specifications, and none of our key controls predicted DISTANT allocations (Tab. 2, Fig. 3, 16 
and SM, section S3.2 for specific modeling steps) 17 
To examine whether the effects of punishing gods on behavior can be experimentally 18 
manipulated under field conditions, in some sites (see Tab. 1), we randomly assigned participants to be 19 
primed with either moralizing gods, local gods, secular authority (the latter in the Dictator Game only), 20 
or a control condition. Since we were interested in the strength of effects of the moralizing gods prime 21 
compared to the other conditions, we set the moralizing gods prime as a reference category for 22 
comparisons in our models (note that this choice does not affect other coefficients of interest; see SM, 23 
S2.1.5). 24 
We observed priming effects consistent with our hypotheses in the raw data (see SM, Fig. S7), 25 
although these patterns weakened after accounting for site fixed effects. Using binomial regression, we 26 
did not observe a difference between the moralizing gods and control conditions in the RAG; however, 27 
participants in the local gods condition had on average odds of 0.85 [95% CI = 0.70 – 1.01] of allocating a 28 
coin into the DISTANT cups compared to the moralizing gods condition (see Tab. 3). Similar patterns 29 
were observed for the DISTANT DGs: there were no differences between the moralizing gods and 30 
control conditions but the coefficients of the treatment with moralizing gods were higher compared to 31 
the local gods and secular authority treatments. While some of these differences were imprecisely 32 
estimated, all the coefficients were in predicted directions (ranging from a difference of 0.22 to 0.63 33 
coins; see Tab. 3 for 95% CI). We speculate that the lack of difference between the moralizing gods and 34 
control conditions occurred because participants in the control condition made allocations close to an 35 
equal split; so reminding people of their moralizing god could not make them, on average, any more 36 
impartial. However, reminding participants of the local gods could, and did to varying degrees, push 37 
people towards favoring SELF and LOCAL over DISTANT co-religionists. Thus, these findings offer only 38 
tentative support for prediction #1B and should be interpreted with caution (see SM, section S3.2 for 39 
further discussion).  40 
Varying Effects of Moralizing Gods on Allocations to Outgroups 41 
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The OUTGROUP games further expanded our Wave I design, pitting the SELF against an OUTGROUP 1 
individual (SELF vs. OUTGROUP), or a DISTANT co-religionist against an OUTGROUP individual (DISTANT vs. 2 
OUTGROUP). Exploring the raw data displayed in Fig. 2 suggested that the effects of punishing and 3 
monitoring gods on OUTGROUP allocations are highly variable and may be site-dependent. To test the 4 
OUTGROUP hypotheses (indiscriminate prosociality vs. religious parochialism), we used the same set of 5 
regression models as in the DISTANT games. 6 
First, consistent with hypothesis #2A, we observed that the punishment-monitoring score 7 
showed no reliable effect on players’ contributions to OUTGROUPs in the SELF vs. OUTGROUP RAG (see 8 
Tab. 2). In the DG, moralizing gods’ punishment and monitoring was associated with increased 9 
contributions to OUTGROUPs at the players’ expense up to an increase of 1.23 coins [95% CI = 0.08 – 10 
2.39]. However, this estimate was fairly imprecise and confidence intervals tightened to exclude zero 11 
only when holding the emotional closeness to and similarity with the OUTGROUP constant, suggesting 12 
that allocations to OUTGROUP members depend on pre-existing relationships (see Tab. 2, Fig. 3, and 13 
SM, Tab. S19). 14 
Testing whether the punishment-monitoring score is associated with favoritism toward DISTANT 15 
co-religionists at the expense of OUTGROUPs (hypothesis #2C), the results from both the DISTANT vs. 16 
OUTGROUP RAG and DG revealed variable effects of the punishment-monitoring score. The general 17 
coefficients were in predicted directions, indicating that the punishment-monitoring score was 18 
associated with the odds of 0.9 [95% CI = 0.66 – 1.24] of allocation to the OUTGROUP cup in the RAG 19 
and with 0.33 [95% CI = -1.20 – 0.54] lower coin allocations in the DG. However, the confidence intervals 20 
suggested high-between site variation (see Tab. 2 and Fig. 3). Breaking down the variation by the type of 21 
moralizing gods’ religion at each site (Christian vs. Other) suggested that the absence of the main effect 22 
may be explained by the fact that at Christian sites, gods’ punishment-monitoring score was on average 23 
associated with higher allocations to OUTGROUPs, while the reverse applied to the other sites (see SM, 24 
section S3.3 for discussion). 25 
Regarding experimental manipulation in the OUTGROUP games, we employed the same priming 26 
techniques as in the DISTANT games (see SM, Fig. S10). For the SELF vs. OUTGROUP RAG, we compared a 27 
control condition with the moralizing gods treatment, observing the odds ratio of 0.91 [95% CI = 0.84 – 28 
0.99] for allocations to OUTGROUPs in the control condition compared to the moralizing gods treatment 29 
(see Tab. 3). In the SELF vs. OUTGROUP DG, we added treatments with local gods and local secular 30 
authority, observing that the moralizing gods treatment predicted an increase of 0.36 coins [95% CI = -31 
0.06 – 0.79] compared to the control condition, 0.68 coins [95% CI = 0.21 – 1.14] compared to the local 32 
gods treatment, and 0.75 coins [95% CI = 0.20 – 1.31] compared to the secular authority treatment (see 33 
Tab. 3). For the DISTANT vs. OUTGROUP games, there were no differences between the moralizing gods and 34 
control conditions in the RAG, and only weak negative differences between the moralizing gods and 35 
other treatments in the DG. In sum, the priming results in the OUTGROUP games do not provide support 36 
for our predictions (#2B and #2D), and suggest that priming may instead promote indiscriminate 37 
prosociality in the SELF vs. OUTGROUP games (see SM, section S3.3 for discussion). 38 
 39 
 40 
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 2 
Tab 2. Coefficients and 95% Confidence Intervals from Binomial and Tobit Regressions Estimating Allocations to the DISTANT/OUTGROUP Cups. Abbreviated 
Results From Full Models. 
 DISTANT Games OUTGROUP Games 
 Random Allocation Game Dictator Game Random Allocation Game Dictator Game 
 
SELF vs. 
DISTANT 
LOCAL vs. 
DISTANT 
SELF vs. 
DISTANT 
LOCAL vs. 
DISTANT 
SELF vs. 
OUTGROUP 
DISTANT vs. 
OUTGROUP 
SELF vs. 
OUTGROUP 
DISTANT vs. 
OUTGROUP 
 OR OR β-Est. β-Est. OR OR β-Est. β-Est. 
MG Pun-Mon 1.26** 1.22* 1.25* 0.89* 1.08 0.90 1.23* -0.33 
 (1.06, 1.49) (1.03, 1.45) (0.25, 2.24) (0.07, 1.70) (0.79, 1.49) (0.66, 1.24) (0.08, 2.39) (-1.20, 0.54) 
LG Pun-Mon 1.07 0.99 0.57 -0.04 0.76* 1.18 -0.05 -0.37 
 (0.94, 1.21) (0.87, 1.12) (-0.13, 1.28) (-0.62, 0.54) (0.61, 0.94) (0.94, 1.47) (-0.88, 0.79) (-1.00, 0.25) 
MG Reward 0.98 0.96 -0.49 -0.27 0.88 1.14 -0.34 0.03 
 (0.86, 1.11) (0.84, 1.09) (-1.13, 0.15) (-0.80, 0.25) (0.73, 1.06) (0.94, 1.38) (-1.05, 0.37) (-0.50, 0.57) 
Police 1.03Ϯ 1.00 0.01 -0.08 1.01 1.02 0.02 -0.06 
 (1.00, 1.07) (0.97, 1.04) (-0.16, 0.17) (-0.22, 0.05) (0.96, 1.06) (0.97, 1.07) (-0.17, 0.21) (-0.20, 0.08) 
Constant 0.81* 0.94 4.43*** 3.54*** 1.30 0.94 2.65*** 4.75*** 
 (0.66, 0.98) (0.77, 1.15) (3.24, 5.62) (2.50, 4.58) (0.94, 1.79) (0.68, 1.29) (1.29, 4.02) (3.71, 5.79) 
N People 602 598 802 792 261 255 636 630 
N Sites 12 12 9 9 7 7 8 8 
Notes: OR = Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) from binomial regression; β-Est. = Beta Estimate from Tobit regression; MG = Moralizing Gods; LG = Local 
Gods; Pun-Mon = Punishment-monitoring. The full models hold constant site-specific mean allocations, treatment, age, sex, number of children, household 
size, material insecurity, emotional closeness and practice similarity to local and distant co-religionists and to outgroup, and police evaluation. Site means are 
modeled as simple fixed effects with Mysore as the reference category (see SM, section S3.1). Note that these models exclude three sites due to the lack of 
local god beliefs (Hadza, Lovu, and Samburu). Reduced models including all sites are displayed in the SM (see Models 2 for Tab. S7-10; Tab. S17-20). 
Ϯ p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Tab 3. Coefficients and 95% Confidence Intervals from Binomial and Tobit Regressions Estimating Allocations to the DISTANT/OUTGROUP Cups 
according to Treatment Groups. 
 DISTANT Games OUTGROUP Games 
 Random Allocation Game Dictator Game Random Allocation Game Dictator Game 
 
SELF vs. 
DISTANT 
LOCAL vs. 
DISTANT 
SELF vs. 
DISTANT 
LOCAL vs. 
DISTANT 
SELF vs. 
OUTGROUP 
DISTANT vs. 
OUTGROUP 
SELF vs. 
OUTGROUP 
DISTANT vs. 
OUTGROUP 
 OR OR β-Est. β-Est. OR OR β-Est. β-Est. 
Control Prime 1.01 0.97 -0.24 -0.02 0.91* 0.99 -0.36Ϯ -0.04 
 (0.96, 1.07) (0.92, 1.03) (-0.66, 0.17) (-0.36, 0.32) (0.84, 0.99) (0.91, 1.08) (-0.79, 0.06) (-0.38, 0.31) 
Local God Prime 0.89 0.85Ϯ -0.63** -0.22 -- -- -0.68** -0.36Ϯ 
 (0.74, 1.06) (0.70, 1.01) (-1.08, -0.17) (-0.60, 0.15) -- -- (-1.14, -0.21) (-0.74, 0.01) 
Secular Authority Prime -- -- -0.45 -0.29  -- -0.75** -0.22 
   (-0.99, 0.10) (-0.73, 0.16) --  (-1.31, -0.20) (-0.68, 0.23) 
Constant 0.98 1.05 4.82*** 3.50*** 1.1 0.97 3.77*** 4.99*** 
 (0.87, 1.10) (0.93, 1.17) (4.08, 5.57) (2.90, 4.11) (0.96, 1.26) (0.84, 1.12) (3.02, 4.53) (4.37, 5.60) 
N People 689 690 997 987 312 309 991 988 
N Sites 9 9 9 9 4 4 9 9 
Notes:  OR = Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) from binomial regression; β-Est. = Beta Estimate from Tobit regression. Moralizing gods prime is 
the reference category, hence the coefficients report differences in the DISTANT and OUTGROUP allocations between the moralizing gods treatment 
compared to the other treatments. The models hold constant site-specific means with Mysore as the reference category; age; sex; number of children; 
size of household; and material insecurity. 
Ϯ p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Discussion 1 
Through four iterations of both the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG), as well 2 
as a priming battery, we examined the effects of beliefs related to supernatural monitoring and 3 
punishment on impartial treatment of various receivers. Controlling for a host of potentially 4 
confounding factors, our results show that higher ratings of moralizing gods as punitive and monitoring 5 
were associated with larger allocations to DISTANT co-religionists when playing with both the SELF and 6 
LOCAL co-religionists in the RAGs and DGs, supporting the intra-religious impartiality hypothesis. The 7 
experimental priming with moralizing gods typically produced larger contributions to DISTANT co-8 
religionists compared to the treatments with local gods and secular authority, but not compared to the 9 
control condition. The lack of difference between the moralizing gods and control conditions resulted 10 
from the fact that the majority of participants committed to moralizing gods played close to 50/50 split 11 
in the control condition, hence the primes had low variation to act upon (in both the DG and RAG,  12 
giving half of the endowment is generally at ceiling on allocations to strangers [6,37]). 13 
These findings support the idea that the cultural evolution of supernatural agents into punishing 14 
and monitoring gods who care about interpersonal, normative conduct may have played a role in the 15 
extension of the cooperative circle beyond kin-networks and local ingroup interests. In small-scale 16 
societies, supernatural agents are often confined to local ecologies with limited spatio-temporal 17 
relevance for people where they may promote parochial cooperation by demanding collective activities 18 
[43,44]. However, since some local gods are tied to a specific place, they do not necessarily provide an 19 
overarching identity for geographically distant communities and are not as interested in normative 20 
conduct of anonymous members of different communities (29; see also SM, Tab. S3). In line with this 21 
proposition, our correlational results showed that belief in moralizing—but not local— gods reduced 22 
local favoritism. Moreover, in the analyses of the priming conditions, the average allocations to DISTANT 23 
co-religionists across all the games were smaller in the local gods treatment compared to the moralizing 24 
gods treatment. While these results are consistent with what the theory predicts, we note that co-25 
religionist recipients in these games were associated with the “moralizing” deity traditions and future 26 
cross-cultural work should investigate impartiality among “local” deity traditions. 27 
 The negligible effects of another key control variable— the reward ratings of moralizing gods— 28 
suggest that it is specifically the belief in the punishing and monitoring (not rewarding) aspects of 29 
supernatural agents that promote higher DISTANT allocations [45]. Similarly, a different body of 30 
literature has suggested that in some cultural and historical circumstances, secular institutions may 31 
outcompete the policing functions provided by belief in punishing and monitoring gods [46,47]. Again, 32 
our results in the DISTANT RAGs and DGs hold even when controlling for relationship to local secular 33 
authority in this particular sample. Consistent with this finding, the secular authority prime led to lower 34 
allocations to DISTANT co-religionists compared to the moralizing gods prime in the DGs, although 35 
confidence intervals for these estimates were quite wide, suggesting considerable variability for which 36 
we have not accounted.  37 
The cultural evolutionary approach developed above further suggests that the increased 38 
impartiality shown toward DISTANT coreligionists in the RAG and DG should not necessarily extend to 39 
religious outgroups (religious parochialism; prediction #2A). Indeed, while self-favoritism was 40 
constrained by commitments to moralizing gods in the SELF vs. DISTANT RAG (above), the punishment-41 
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monitoring score did not play a role in curbing self-favoritism when playing the RAG with OUTGROUP. 1 
This result points to the parochial effects of moralizing gods, who may be concerned with normative 2 
conduct toward co-religionists but not necessarily toward outgroups. The result of SELF vs. OUTGROUP DG 3 
was more complicated. In this DG, we observed a positive correlation between punishment-monitoring 4 
ratings and allocations to OUTGROUPs; however, this coefficient was not robust across different model 5 
specifications and only emerged as significant at conventional levels when both people’s relationship 6 
with, and similarity to, the OUTGROUP were held constant (c.f. [48]). This relationship suggests that 7 
when groups are sufficiently similar and maintain prior favorable relationships, belief in punishing and 8 
monitoring gods may deter extremely selfish treatment of outgroup members in the DG (i.e., zero 9 
allocations; see SM, section S3.3 for discussion). In line with this interpretation, priming moralizing gods 10 
increased OUTGROUP allocations in both the SELF vs. OUTGROUP RAG and DG compared to the control 11 
condition (but never raised them above the 50/50 split). 12 
Finally, we hypothesized that individuals would make a distinction between DISTANT co-13 
religionists and OUTGROUPs (#2C), promoting the competitiveness of one’s own religious group by 14 
increasing allocations to DISTANT co-religionists at the expense of OUTGROUPs. While the coefficients in 15 
both the RAG and DG were in the predicted direction, the confidence intervals of those effects 16 
suggested considerable between-site variability. We explored a hypothesis stating that in the absence of 17 
intergroup hostility (as shown by our OUTGROUP emotional closeness measure, see SM, Tab. S4), 18 
religions appealing to universal norms— which may ultimately foster proselytizing— would put 19 
emphasis on indiscriminate prosociality manifested in higher OUTGROUP allocations. Our supplemental 20 
analyses indeed suggest opposite trends in allocation to OUGROUPs at Christian versus non-Christian 21 
sites; however, caution should be exercised in interpreting these results as we would need larger 22 
samples and other religions with universalistic appeal for precise estimates of this effect (se SM, section 23 
S3.3 for further discussion).  24 
While deploying our experiments across cultures, we also encountered limitations to our multi-25 
site experimental approach. Our main measure (punishment-monitoring abilities) exhibited low 26 
variation at some sites where the maximum value possible was also the modal score. This may have 27 
been an artifact of our pre-selection of gods that were specifically concerned with human interpersonal 28 
normative conduct, but more nuanced measurements of participants' beliefs should improve future 29 
estimates. Furthermore, while we attempted to define DISTANT co-religionists and OUTGROUPs solely 30 
along religious lines, some sites— due to facts on the ground— had to merge ethnicity and religion 31 
when defining recipient groups (see SM for more details and additional analyses). We attempted to 32 
control for different OUTGROUP relationships by our measure of relationship to the OUTGROUP, but 33 
future research should obtain detailed estimates of interaction frequency, cooperative exchange, and 34 
conflict history. This applies to other types of culturally evolved groupings such as markets or political 35 
institutions (for details see [49]). Finally, adapting priming techniques to fit the specific context at each 36 
site yielded substantial variability in those techniques, possibly hindering the general estimates of the 37 
priming effects. These effects might have also been confounded by the fact that our design necessitated 38 
the use of religious reminders on cup labels, possibly subtly priming all participants (see SM 3.2.4 for 39 
discussion). 40 
Despite these limitations, the current work used a larger and more culturally diverse sample to 41 
support our previous findings regarding the role of moralizing gods in expanding the social circle [8,22], 42 
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and replicated these findings in a new experiment (the Dictator Game) while also revealing tentative 1 
support for our predictions using the priming technique in the field. Extending our experimental 2 
paradigm to investigate religious parochialism, we observed little or no support for our outgroup 3 
predictions; however, exploratory analyses suggested new lines of theoretical and empirical work. Taken 4 
together, this study investigated a particular culturally evolved mechanism that may have contributed to 5 
the expansion of human societies, and illustrates one interdisciplinary approach for moving beyond 6 
narrow sampling strategies and harnessing the planet’s rich human diversity to shed light on key 7 
questions of cultural evolution. 8 
 9 
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Figure Captions 
 
Fig 1. Density Plots of DISTANT Co-religionist and OUTGROUP Allocations in the Random Allocation and Dictator 
Games. A. Participants allocated 30 coins between two cups in each RAG. Deviations from the predicted binomial 
distribution point to biased money allocation. B. The distribution of participants’ allocations in the DGs revealed 
more between-site variability compared to the RAGs. The dashed vertical lines indicate an equitable split between 
cups (15 in the RAGs and 5 in the DGs). In. Tanna = Inland Tanna; Co. Tanna = Coastal Tanna. Note that these raw 
data do not control for the fact that some participants were primed during experiments. 
 
Fig 2. Positive Effects of Moralizing Gods on DISTANT Allocations and Varying Effects on OUTGROUP Allocations. 
Displayed are raw means with 95% CI and density plots; dashed vertical lines indicate the moralizing gods effect. 
These effects are illustrative only because we collapsed the punishment-monitoring score into three (instead of 
five categories for easier reading: 0.0-0.3, 0.3-0.7, 0.7-1.0). These plots also do not take into account between site 
differences and distributional assumptions (see Tab. 2 for specific estimates). Note that the number of participants 
in each level of the MG Pun-Mon variable substantially differs (with MG Pun-Mon = 1 having the most and MG 
Pun-Mon = 0 the least participants); see Fig. S2 for histograms. 
 
Fig 3. Moralizing Gods’ Punishment-Monitoring Regression Coefficients with 95% CI Showing Different Effects on 
DISTANT and OUTGROUP Allocations. Rating moralizing gods as monitoring and punishing predicted larger 
allocations to the DISTANT co-religionist cups when playing with both SELF and LOCAL co-religionist cups in both 
the RAGs and DGs. The same rating did not predict allocations to the OUTGROUP cups in the SELF vs. OUTGROUP 
RAG; however, we observed a positive effect in the SELF vs. OUTGROUP DG. The coefficients for the DISTANT vs. 
OUTGROUP RAG and DG were in predicted directions but exhibited between-site variability. X-axis for the RAG is on 
the logistic scale. 
 
 
